Public and private roles in malaria control: the contributions of economic analysis. by Hanson, Kara
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ROLES IN MALARIA CONTROL: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
KARA HANSON
Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom
Abstract. There has been high profile advocacy and debate about how to increase availability and uptake of effective
malaria control interventions. Application of the tools of public economics indicates that market failures occur for a
number of effective malaria control interventions due to monopoly, externalities, and information failures, implying a
role for public action. However, additional analysis is required to determine the optimal form of public intervention, and
how to set priorities. Additional criteria of cost-effectiveness, impact on poverty and catastrophic expenditures, afford-
ability, characteristics of supply and demand, and potential for leakage are invoked to help inform decision making in
the field of malaria control policies. Particular emphasis is placed on the connections between public and private actions.
INTRODUCTION
Amid calls for increased funding for infectious disease from
the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health1 and the
creation of the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria, there
has been high profile advocacy and debate about how to in-
crease availability and uptake of effective malaria control in-
terventions.2–4 Much of this debate centers around the appro-
priate roles for the public and private sectors in financing and
delivery of malaria control interventions. This article aims to
outline how the tools of economic analysis can contribute to
these discussions and inform the process of priority setting,
together with some of the key information gaps.
PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND THE ROLE FOR
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
MALARIA CONTROL
Conventional economic analysis starts with the tools of
public economics that establish the efficiency of private com-
petitive markets in allocating resources. For markets to op-
erate efficiently, a number of criteria must be met: consumers
and producers are assumed to have perfect information, there
are many firms in the market producing homogeneous goods,
and firms are free to enter and exit the market. In this frame-
work, the role for public action (i.e., by national and donor
governments) is to undertake financing of interventions only
where markets fail to reach a social optimum.
The same economic framework sets out a number of areas
where market failure is expected a priori. These are mo-
nopoly, public goods and externalities, and information fail-
ure (Table 1). All of these are pervasive in the area of malaria
control, providing support for extensive public intervention.
First, monopoly in supply, where there is only one producer
of a good, can lead to the charging of excessive prices. Patent
protection is a mechanism for explicitly protecting monopoly
status of pharmaceutical firms over particular products to al-
low firms to recoup the costs of research and development.
While there is widespread agreement that incentives for drug
discovery are essential to provide appropriate incentives for
pharmaceutical firms to invest in research and development,
one consequence is that drugs for diseases that affect poor
countries may be unaffordable. This problem has been well-
documented in the case of anti-retroviral drugs for the man-
agement of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immu-
nodeficiency syndrome, due to high-profile advocacy by
international non-governmental organizations. A number of
mechanisms for public action to promote access to drugs
while retaining incentives for pharmaceutical firms have been
proposed. These include differential pricing, guaranteed pub-
lic purchase agreements, licensing of local production, and
public-private partnerships to subsidize costs of research and
development (Gardiner E, unpublished data).
Second, many malaria control interventions have public
goods characteristics or externalities. Public goods are non-
rival in consumption (one person’s consumption does not re-
duce the quantity available for another to consume) and non-
excludable (it is impossible to exclude those who do not pay
for the good from consuming it). As a consequence of these
two characteristics, a private seller cannot recoup the value to
the consumer and such goods will not be provided in private
markets. Externalities, which can be positive or negative, rep-
resent benefits (or costs) of consumption or production that
are not fully valued by the consumer/producer. Markets will
tend to under provide (for positive externalities) or over pro-
vide (for negative externalities) goods with these character-
istics.
In malaria control, indoor residual spraying (IRS) can be
understood as a public good. The private benefits from IRS
are limited in part because the intervention works against
mosquitoes that are resting on indoor surfaces after having
taken a blood meal. Thus, the benefits to the inhabitants of a
sprayed residence are likely to be minimal. The main benefit
of IRS is felt at the community level in terms of reduced
vectorial capacity of the mosquito population, through re-
duced longevity. Providing that coverage of physical struc-
tures is high enough, IRS provides benefits that are non-
excludable (those who have not sprayed their homes will also
benefit), and non-rival (the benefit of reduced vectorial ca-
pacity is not reduced by one household’s enjoyment of it).
Together, these characteristics mean that there will be a
“free-rider” problem, and in the limit, there will be no private
production at all. Under such circumstances, private markets
will not produce enough of the intervention relative to its
social benefits.* This justifies public action in the form of
financing of a residual spraying program. The same argument
* Even in this case private benefits from spraying may arise in the
form of protection against other nuisance creatures such as bedbugs.
However, these are assumed to be small in relation to the public
health benefits.
Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg., 71(Suppl 2), 2004, pp. 168–173
Copyright © 2004 by The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene
168
applies to environmental measures to reduce mosquito breed-
ing places.
Most other malaria control interventions are mixed private
and public goods, that is, they provide significant private ben-
efit, and therefore there will be some degree of willingness-
to-pay for them. However, because there are positive exter-
nalities to their consumption, private demand will fall short of
the socially optimal level. For example, untreated mosquito
nets are primarily a private good that provide a measure of
personal protection5 as long as they are without holes. Insec-
ticide treatment of nets boosts this individual effect by pro-
tecting users even when there are holes in the net, but in
addition confers a mass effect through reduction of mosquito
longevity, which benefits even those not sleeping under a
net.6–9 For this reason, there is a strong economic rationale
for public intervention to ensure adequate uptake of insecti-
cide for net re-treatment, and for long-lasting nets, when they
become more widely available, to increase their use.
Artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) is another
example of a mixed good that offers the possibility of im-
proved therapeutic effectiveness at the individual level, plus
the potential positive externalities of reduced malaria trans-
mission and reduced growth of drug resistance. The potential
for reduction in transmission, which arises because artemisi-
nin acts on the gametocyte phase of the parasite cycle, has
been demonstrated in studies in refugee camps on Thailand’s
border with Myanmar.10,11 Other studies suggested that ACT
in these areas has allowed efficacy of mefloquine (the product
used in combination with artemisinin) to stabilize or even
recover.12
An additional challenge, however, is that the existence and
size of some positive externalities may vary across contexts.
For instance, there is some doubt as to whether the two posi-
tive externalities associated with ACT are likely to arise in
areas of high transmission, such as most of sub-Saharan Af-
rica.13 Potential problems are related to differences in malaria
epidemiology, health systems and policy, and human behav-
ior. Concerning the first, the much higher entomologic inocu-
lation rates in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa raise the risk
of re-exposure after treatment, when blood drug levels are
sub-therapeutic. This could be a source of selective pressure.
Furthermore, due to acquired immunity in high transmission
areas, a smaller proportion of infected individuals are symp-
tomatic and therefore seek treatment: these asymptomatic
individuals may be a source of gametocytes, maintaining high
levels of transmission.
An important health system-related factor is the predomi-
nance of clinical diagnosis, which results in high levels of
over-diagnosis of malaria and consequent overtreatment,14,15
which may increase overall selective drug pressure if treated
individuals are subsequently infected, and poor drug use by
many providers in the public and private sectors.16,17 A sec-
ond health system–related factor is the increasing emphasis in
sub-Saharan Africa on home-based treatment by increasing
the accessibility of malaria drugs and caregivers’ knowledge
about how to use them. This is in response to the rapidity with
which malaria infection can progress quickly to severe or fatal
illness, with many children dying in the home without re-
course to formal health care providers. The strategy also aims
to capitalize on the fact that the majority of treatment already
takes place in the home, with drugs purchased from shops or
acquired in previous visits to health facilities.18–22 Concerns
have been raised, however, that such strategies may lead to
increased misuse of drugs and consequent selective pressure
in the context of ACT, with its more complex therapeutic
regimen.23 In contrast, in areas of low transmission, the trend
has been towards increased control of drugs within the health
facility, with greater use of diagnostic technologies.
Human behavior, which is likely to both influence and be
influenced by epidemiological factors, could also undermine
the potential for externalities arising from ACT. There is a
substantial degree of self-treatment of malaria in Africa, and
associated inappropriate drug use. In the context of ACT, this
could lead to inappropriate dosing and inadequate adherence
to more complex ACT treatment regimens, and potentially to
the use of either of the drugs as monotherapy. Thus, given the
complexity of the relationship between transmission and drug
resistance, it is not clear that the societal benefits of ACT that
have been demonstrated in southeast Asia will be seen in the
sub-Saharan African context.13
A third source of market failure is information failure. Such
problems may take the form of information asymmetry be-
tween a consumer and their provider “agent” (for example, a
doctor or pharmacist who is asked to guide them as to the
most appropriate course of action), who may behave oppor-
tunistically and take advantage of the consumer’s ignorance
about the most appropriate treatment. There may also be a
more basic information failure in the form of provider and
patient ignorance about the most appropriate treatment or
the availability of effective means of prevention. For example,
a number of studies have identified low levels of provider
knowledge of correct antimalarial drug dosages.16,17,24 Con-
sumer knowledge of correct dosages is also poor, often lead-
ing to both under- and over-dosing. The benefits of insecti-
cide-treated nets (ITNs) are still not widely known in some
communities. For instance, in one district of Tanzania in 1999
only 45% of household heads had heard of ITNs (Kikumbih
N, unpublished data). The invisible nature of insecticide treat-
TABLE 1
Market failures in malaria control*
Type of market failure Malaria control examples
Monopoly power Patient protection of new drugs
Public goods/externalities Mass effect of ITNs and environmental control measures
Reduced drug resistance from use of ACT
Reduced transmission from use of ACT
Information failures Lack of knowledge about effective means of treatment and prevention
Lack of knowledge about how to take complex ACT regimens
Poverty Limited ability to pay for costly interventions such as ACT, ITNs
* ITNs  insecticide-treated nets; ACT  artemisinin-based combination therapy.
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ment of nets is likely to lead to sub-optimal levels of demand,
as shown by low re-treatment rates even in projects where net
uptake is high and net treatment vigorously promoted.5,25
In contrast to these situations where market failure is ex-
pected a priori due to the economic characteristics of the
interventions, markets can also fail to deliver socially optimal
outcomes in instances of poverty. It is well known that sub-
Saharan Africa bears the greatest share of the burden of ma-
laria, with 90% of the deaths. While there is little evidence
that within poor countries malaria incidence is higher among
the poor (Filmer D, unpublished data), poor households are
at greatest risk of the most severe consequences of illness, in
terms of the risk of death and the economic consequences of
costly treatment (Worrall E and others, unpublished data).
This classification of malaria control interventions accord-
ing to the standard public economics framework suggests that
there is significant scope for public financing to correct mar-
ket failures, which arise either due to the economic charac-
teristics of the interventions, or to the link between poverty
and malaria and its consequences. However, the theory of
public economics is silent about how to intervene to achieve
better outcomes. For example, should governments subsidize
the cost of ITNs, or spend money on public information cam-
paigns that will shift demand towards the socially optimal
level? Nor does it aid in prioritizing among market failures. In
practice, governments and donors still have to choose among
interventions since their budgets do not usually allow them to
provide universal coverage of all interventions with public or
mixed good characteristics. There are further issues in con-
sidering the optimal provision (in contrast to financing) of
malaria control interventions. While economists often assume
that the incentives associated with for-profit motivation will
lead the private sector to deliver interventions more effi-
ciently, the problems with monopoly and information asym-
metry outlined earlier mean that private production will not
necessarily be optimal. In a “second best” world, no simple
economic theorem can guide the choice between public and
private provision.
Thus, the standard tools of public economics can help to
make the case for public intervention, but are less useful in
determining the form that intervention should take, and in
setting priorities for public action in financing and providing
interventions. However, there are a range of other economic
tools that can be applied to inform these policy decisions.
EXPANDING THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK:
CRITERIA FOR GUIDING PUBLIC ACTION
In this section, the case for public action to increase uptake
of malaria control interventions is taken as given. A number
of additional economic tools and perspectives are described
that can help to inform policy decisions about the form such
intervention should take and how priorities should be set.
Key information gaps are also identified.
Cost-effectiveness of interventions. Evidence about the
cost-effectiveness of interventions is often used to inform de-
cisions about how to allocate public sector health funds. Cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) provides a framework for sys-
tematically comparing the costs and consequences of health
interventions, summarizing this in terms of a cost-effectivness
ratio (CER). When choosing how to spend a fixed health
budget, the procedure is to first rank all possible interventions
in terms of their cost-effectiveness, begin implementing the
most cost-effective intervention until the disease burden with
that disease is eliminated, then continue down the list adopt-
ing gradually less cost-effective interventions until the budget
is exhausted. This process assumes that the CER is invariant
to the scale of intervention: if ratios vary with scale, then
efficiency may require switching to the next-best intervention
before the first burden is eliminated.26 However, because the
benefits in CEA are measured in terms of health outcomes
(usually disability-adjusted life-years [DALYs] or quality-
adjusted life years), it is not possible to compare the benefits
of investing in health with other uses of these funds (for ex-
ample, education or infrastructure development). As a result,
CEA cannot be used to argue for increasing the size of the
health budget.
In the field of malaria control, analysis by Goodman and
others of the cost-effectiveness of malaria interventions
showed that many are “attractive” (< $100/DALY averted) or
“very attractive” (< $25/DALY averted) interventions.27 For
example, insecticide treatment of existing mosquito nets was
estimated to cost $4–10 per DALY averted, providing nets
and re-treatment $19–85 per DALY averted, and intermittent
presumptive treatment of pregnant women (IPTp) through
existing antenatal services $4–29 per DALY averted. Such
analyses are extremely useful in strengthening the argument
for prioritizing malaria control within public sector health
budgets.
However, most cost-effectiveness evidence is based on very
specific delivery mechanisms. In the case of ITNs, for ex-
ample, the earlier analysis was costed on the basis of the same
delivery mode as used in the main efficacy trials (free nets
with regular retreatment by project staff). For IPTp, it was
assumed that delivery would be through public sector static
health facilities. Little systematic evidence has been collected
about costs and health consequences of other delivery ap-
proaches, although one study showed that social marketing of
ITNs can be at least as cost-effective ($37–57 per DALY
averted) as public sector delivery.28 Costs of alternative de-
livery mechanisms will also vary across settings. For example,
commercial sector delivery of ITNs costs $3–5 per net in Tan-
zania,29 but up to $10 in Mozambique.30
Reaching the poor and protecting against catastrophic ex-
penditures. A further gap in the cost-effectiveness literature is
evidence about the cost-effectiveness of reaching different
socioeconomic groups. One exception is work associated with
the Kilombero and Ulanga Insecticide-Treated Net (KINET)
project that showed that social marketing of ITNs is more
costly than a pure commercial sector approach, but is more
effective at reaching those in the lowest socioeconomic
groups and those located outside of village centers (Kikumbih
N, unpublished data). A more systematic approach is needed
to assessing the costs and consequences of reaching the poor-
est with essential interventions.31
Certain interventions may be so costly that their expense
can drive a household into poverty. For poor households, the
threshold level at which expenditures become catastrophic is
much lower.32 Hospital treatment of complicated or severe
malaria is one such intervention. A recent review of the lit-
erature did not identify any estimates of the cost of inpatient
care as a share of household income,33 but earlier estimates of
the distribution of malaria spending across socioeconomic
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groups in Malawi found little difference across groups in ab-
solute levels of expenditure on hospital admission for malaria,
implying that payments are regressive (i.e., are a greater share
of total expenditure for the poor than the rich).34 In such
cases, there is an equity rationale for subsidizing the cost of
hospital care. An additional complexity is whether subsidies
in this case should be universal or targeted towards specific
groups. Evidence from a variety of settings indicates that the
rich capture a disproportionate share of the subsidy on hos-
pital treatment in general, providing an argument for closer
targeting of public spending.32 However, there are a number
of practical and political difficulties associated with targeting
of subsidies.35
Affordability to government. In addition to cost-effective-
ness, affordability as it relates to the total cost of an interven-
tion must also be considered. Interventions may be highly
cost-effective yet still unaffordable to governments. For in-
stance, it has been estimated that in a typical country, cover-
ing the entire population at risk of malaria with ITNs would
cost 24% of the total government health budget.27
Characteristics of supply: substitution, quality, and effi-
ciency in public and private delivery. Another important con-
sideration is the availability of substitute providers of an in-
tervention. Where the private sector is already involved in
delivering a cost-effective intervention, increased public pro-
vision might simply substitute for private provision, leading to
no net increase in use or coverage.36 In the case of ITNs, it is
likely that where there is already a private market for ITNs,
public supply would substitute for private supply. This would
be inefficient in the sense that individuals who would other-
wise have purchased a net at commercial prices will simply
shift their consumption to the free public sector.† An accurate
picture of the existence of substitute providers (actual or po-
tential) is therefore essential, and requires better information
about the entire market for these interventions. The question
of potential providers is important, particularly when exam-
ining markets for new products such as ITNs: if public in-
volvement means discouraging entry by a commercial sector
that would otherwise have entered the market, then this
would still be considered to be crowding out (known in eco-
nomics as the counterfactual argument). A degree of crowd-
ing out of the private commercial sector by a subsidized social
marketing product was observed in the KINET project (Ki-
kumbih N, unpublished data), and of a less-subsidized social
marketing product by a more-subsidized one in another social
marketing project in Tanzania (Hanson K, Jones C, unpub-
lished data).
An alternative scenario is one in which public provision can
help to build a market for a product, known as “pump prim-
ing” in the World Health Organization Strategic Frame-
work29 or “crowding in” the private sector. At the aggregate
level, donor-funded social marketing in Tanzania over the
period 1998 to 2002 can be argued to have encouraged the
expansion of the commercial manufacturing and distribution
system. The market is now mature enough that the public
sector has been able to move out of the business of supplying
nets, and focuses on subsidizing insecticide, continued de-
mand creation, and supporting the commercial sector in
strengthening their distribution network.
By competing with the commercial sector, the donor-
funded social marketing activities also encouraged it to be
more responsive to consumer preferences. The Tanzanian net
manufacturers now produce a dazzling variety of shapes,
sizes, and colors of nets. In other settings, it has been argued
that by providing a high-quality alternative, the public sector
has encouraged the private sector to maintain and improve
the quality of curative health services.36
The degree to which private and public delivery are ad-
equate substitutes depends on their quality and their effi-
ciency. Displacing poor-quality or very expensive private pro-
vision with more appropriate and efficient public supply could
save resources, particularly if a societal perspective is taken.
For instance, as governments begin to change to antimalarial
combination therapy, public provision may act as an encour-
agement to private providers to follow suit. At the same time,
it is important to recognize the very poor quality of services
provided in many public facilities: governments fail as well as
markets, and the existence of a vibrant private informal drug
market may be a good indication of problems of quality and
patient satisfaction in the public sector.
Characteristics of the demand for services. Another critical
issue is the responsiveness of demand for malaria interven-
tions to price (the price elasticity of demand). For example, if
demand is highly sensitive to price, then selling subsidized
ITNs through public health facilities could have a dramatic
impact on coverage. In contrast, the subsidy could have little
effect if demand is price inelastic. To date, information about
price elasticity of demand for ITNs is confined to hypothetical
willingness-to-pay questions, and there is no empirical evi-
dence of willingness to pay for ACT.37 There is a critical need
for better information on the price elasticity of demand for
ITNs and ACT based on actual market behavior to guide
decisions about how much to subsidize prices to increase cov-
erage.
If the aim of government intervention is to encourage in-
creased coverage among the poor, the income elasticity of
demand must also be known. If an intervention is highly in-
come elastic, then most of the benefits of any subsidized pro-
vision are likely to be captured by the better-off. A related
issue is the types of providers that poor people are most likely
to use: for example, within the broad category of private pro-
viders, poor people may be more likely to use informal drug
sellers than formal health service providers.38 Policy efforts to
encourage coverage of effective interventions among the poor
need to take account of these use patterns.
Potential for leakage and cross-border movements. Where
there are significant price differentials across shared interna-
tional borders, and problems of control and monitoring of
public sector supplies, illegal cross-border flows of commodi-
ties are likely to come about. The potential for such cross-
border flows clearly exists with such higher value commodi-
ties as ACT and ITNs, where the incentives to divert public
supplies may be considerable. Careful monitoring is needed,
and there may be arguments for a regional approach to policy.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
There are powerful economic arguments to support public
action to increase the uptake of effective malaria control in-
† In the case of pure public goods, such as IRS, crowding out is not an
issue because no private market will exist.
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terventions. Market failures are likely to arise from monopoly
power of pharmaceutical firms, positive externalities associ-
ated with insecticide-treatment of nets, residual spraying, en-
vironmental control, and, potentially, ACT and information
problems. In addition, commercial markets are unlikely to
guarantee adequate uptake of interventions in contexts of
widespread poverty.
The challenge is to prioritize areas for public action. Exist-
ing funding for malaria control is inadequate to fund the full
menu of effective interventions with market failures, and
even if considerable additional funds are made available
through global initiatives such as the Global Fund for AIDS,
Malaria and TB, priorities will still need to be set. In face of
information failures and externalities, public funding should
be focused on those interventions that are most cost-effective.
Existing evidence shows that most existing malaria control
interventions are very cost-effective, costing less than $100/
DALY averted. There are important information gaps, how-
ever, relating to the costs and consequences of alternative
delivery strategies, and the costs of reaching the poor.
Other criteria, too, must be applied to the choice of what
the public sector should do. To the extent that public policy is
concerned with the impact of malaria on poverty, costly in-
terventions that can have catastrophic consequences for
households should be considered.
Perhaps most challenging is to consider the link between
public and private sector activity. On the one hand, private
delivery of interventions such as ITNs and drugs offers the
potential to extend coverage and focus public sector resources
on those most in need; at the same time, the many deficiencies
of the private sector in terms of quality and reach of distri-
bution networks must be recognized. These factors will differ
across contexts, requiring careful assessment of local condi-
tions and provider characteristics. What is clear, however, is
that public action will influence the private sector, and the
likely impact needs to be assessed in making public choices.
Future technological developments may simplify or make
more complex the relationship between optimal public and
private roles. For instance, it is currently relatively inexpen-
sive and feasible to publicly subsidize insecticide for net treat-
ment, but the binding of public and private benefits that will
come about through long-lasting nets will require new fund-
ing mechanisms, such as licensing agreements for manufac-
turers.
Finally, it is important to recognize that financing and pro-
vision can often be separated in delivering interventions.
Even if there is a strong case for public subsidy due to market
failures, it is not necessarily the case that this must be deliv-
ered through public sector channels. Other options exist, such
as vouchers which can be redeemed at private providers,39 or
contracting of private providers. The choice of how to inter-
vene will require a careful assessment of the options avail-
able, and their suitability to specific contexts.
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